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Abstract. With the “mathematical watershed”, Logic had been transformed into
a foundational theory for mathematics, a theory of truth and proofs - far away from
its philosophical status of theory of the intellectual process of reasoning. With the
recent substitution of the traditional proofs-as-discourses paradigm by the proofs-
as-programs one, Logic is now becomming a foundational theory for computing.
One could interpret this new watershed as being “yet another technological drift”,
bringing Logic always closer to practical ingeneering, always further from the hu-
man intellectual process of reasoning. This article promote the dual point of view:
enlightened by the contemporary analysis of the dynamic of proofs, which bring
us to a new understanding of the semantic counterpart of processes operationality
(including the links between semantic dereliction due to inconsistency and compu-
tational exuberance), Logic has never appeared so close to being, finally, the theory
of reasoning.
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1. Introduction
When it comes to giving a short definition of Logic, one frequently
hears (sometimes even said by oneself) that Logic is “the theory of
reasoning”. Yet, all contemporary logicians know very well that Logic,
as it is practiced today, is not properly about reasoning, but about
proofs. Reasoning indeed is a human intellectual process, wheras proofs
− as logicians, from Aristotle to Gentzen, have investigated them−
are discourses: oral or written, maybe only formalized, but discourses
nonetheless.
This shortcut made by logicians when presenting their discipline (or
perhaps more accurately said: “the fantasy” of logicians when they are
representing to themselves the subject of their work) actually accompa-
nied Logic, under various declensions, all along its history. Moreover, as
starts in the XIXth century the process of gradual absorption of Logic
∗ Lecture given under title From Natural Deduction to the nature of reasoning, at
the colloquium Natural Deduction organized by Luiz Carlos Pereira and dedicated
to the work of Dag Prawitz, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, July 2001. To appear in Luiz
Carlos. Pereira, Edward Hermann Hauesler and Valeria de Paiva (eds.), Advances in
Natural deduction (proceedings of the 2001 “Natural Deduction” conference, PUC,
Rio de Janeiro, Brasil), Springer.
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by Mathematics, the view of Logic as being the “Theory of thought”
itself continues to prevail1 and, even after the birth of proper Proof
theory − actually by the pen of its promotor himself, David Hilbert
−, it is reiterated: “The fundamental idea of my proof theory is non
other than to describe the activity of our understanding, to make a
protocol of the rules according to which our thinking actually proceeds”
(Hilbert 1927, p. 475).
As those same logicians who present Logic choosing such words,
in the meantime explicitely deny any psychological nature to logi-
cal principles, one sees that, underlying such formulations, stands the
somewhat confuse idea that some kind of isomorphism or interface
would hold between the rules “according to which our thinking pro-
ceeds” (or “has to proceed” as well2) and the rules linking sentences in
our deductive discourses, so would hold between reasonings and proofs.
To clarify how reasoning and proofs however radically differ, it is
useful to stress the three following specific points, more or less tradi-
tionnally emphasized when comparing the two notions. First, as it is a
process, reasoning is of a dynamic nature, whereas proofs, as discourses
and especially as texts, are static objects. Second, the intellectual, ra-
tional process of reasoning would presuppose the grasping of meaning,
the mental representation of objects and structures, which is frequently
summed up by speaking of the “semantic” or “contentual” aspects of
reasoning, whereas proofs articulate sentences inferentially, according
only to their shape, without regard for reference. Third, wheras a wrong
proof is not a proof, incorrect reasoning still is reasoning.
Dynamic character of reasoning versus Static character of proofs
Referential dimension of reasoning versus Inferential nature of proofs
Indeterminacy of reasoning versus Correctness of proofs
The reasons why contemporary Logic happens to deal with proofs
instead of reasoning are numerous and varied. They are on the whole
tied up with the fact that the silent human process of reasoning remains
mainly observable through private mental self-introspection (or perhaps
through some difficult to exploit but measurable side-effects, e.g., those
produced by neural activity etc.), so that consciousness intervenes in
its study, moreover both as an object and as a tool for observation.
Even if, disregarding the usual problem of subjectivity’s epistemological
weakness, one acknowledged as relevant a question such as : “what
information could introspection reveal to us concerning reasoning ?”,
the following specific difficulties−which match up with the three points
stressed above− would have to be taken into account.
A first obstacle which prevents a direct approach to the intellectual
process of reasoning is its introspective opaqueness. As David Hume
1 G. Boole’s Investigation of the Laws of Thought is here emblematic (Boole,
1930).
2 The fact that even the early intuitionistic tradition conceived explicitely Logic
as a non psychological organon, as pure normativity (see for instance Kant, Logik,
introduction, first section), does not obliterate its conception of Logic as the science
of the laws of thought : that Logic studies “the rules according to which our thinking
must proceed”, rather than “how it proceeds” does not make any difference here.
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so nicely says, “it is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind
that, though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become
the object of reflexion, they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the
eye readily find those lines and boundaries which discriminate and
distinguish them” (Hume, 1748, ch. 1). The complex temporality and
profound structure of reasoning, with its likely distributed interaction
mechanisms, generally escapes our consciousness. Because we can per-
ceive at best only some of the epiphenomenal, conscious effects of this
internal process, we are unable to qualify directly its deep technological
nature and have a direct apprehension of its dynamic. In strong contrast
with this situation, rational discourses, and especially written ones, are
by definition communicable and completely observable objects, and so
are describable phenomena without any hidden parts, whose stability
a contrario permit the manifestation and study of their structure.
Another obstacle is just simply that we are not clearly able to even
recognize reasoning, unable “from the inside” to separate from the
general stream of our thought some sub-process which would constitute
its “rational part” and be independent of emotions and, especially when
deliberation about practical choices is involved, of desires, fears and
social determinations. In any event, when considering human thought
in vivo, the traditional splitting of rational and non rational aspects
seems rather arbitrary (this is also why the specific dynamic of wrong or
mistaken reasoning is so unclear). In strong contrast with this situation,
proofs as opposed to reasoning, or at least formalized proofs, are recog-
nizable (for a text to be a proof is a decidable property). In particular,
once a list of “logical rules” has been set down, the borderline between
proofs and non proofs becomes unambiguously determined.
Finally, a relevant theory of reasoning should cover the referential di-
mension of the rational process, and hence would presuppose a theory
of meaning as mental representation. This usually leads to unclear
metaphorical formulations such as intimate “grasp” of semantic “con-
tent”, private, direct mental contact with concepts, and to all manners
of ambiguities that torment the philosophy of mind and consciousness.
In strong contrast with this situation again, the logical analysis of dis-
cursivity opens onto a theory of objective, consciousness-independant
meaning.
Among these issues, the last one constitutes the point of departure
for analytic philosophy (in the true sense, i.e. restricted to epistemo-
logical topics), whose dismissal of psychologism in favour of semantic
analysis parallels the methodological dismissal of reasoning as an object
of study which de facto prevails in Logic. In a conference given in 1987,
in which he extricated the roots of the analytic watershed in philosophy,
Michael Dummett deepened the question of this methodological prece-
dence of language over thought (Dummett, 1987). I am retaining from
him, notably, the thesis that because there is something objective in
meaning (as communicability shows) which is completely involved and
kept within discursivity (as communication shows), the only objective
knowledge about thought we can hope to grasp, if ever any, shall be
proportionate to what is objective in discursivity: its structure, the
norms which regulate our practice and use, or whatever . . .
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In the present article, I will remain faithful to this analytic inspi-
ration, which as I understand it, does not disqualify inquiries into
reasoning, but merely postpone them as questions which could be
posed only afterwards, as ”secondary” questions. Instead of entering
into the habitual debate over “truth conditions” which often comes
down to searching outside of discursivity for an objective foundation for
semantics (facts described by sets, worlds of concepts, human rational
practices whose only criterion is to be the ones humans happen to learn,
etc.), I would like to focus my investigations upon objective features
of discursivity and proofs that have been revealed by recent proof-
theoretical developments, beginning with Gentzen’s seminal work and
continuing through later work based on the so-called Curry-Howard
correspondance between proofs and programs (i.e. the remark that the
evaluation of simply typed lambda-calculus and the normalisation of
minimal Natural Deduction are isomorphic), have revealed.
More specifically, my aim here is to evaluate to what extent these de-
velopments give new insights into the relationship between “reasoning”
(the human rational mental process) and “proofs” (structured infer-
ential texts). I will tackle this question by successively taking up the
three particular points recalled above which differentiate reasoning and
proofs, examining in each case how to articulate them in light of recent
proof-theoretical investigations (in particular those from the so-called
proofs-as-programs paradigm).
2. Dynamic character of reasoning versus Static character
of proofs
Whereas reasoning is a process, and thus inseparable from its dy-
namic, proofs, as usually taken into account by formal Logic, are tra-
ditionally apprehended as texts, and at first glance lack any true dy-
namic dimension. Indeed, one occasionally finds the absence of dynamic
used against the formalist perspective in Logic, which is then typi-
cally blamed for being only occupied with cold, lifeless, static things,
thus incomparable to human reasoning3. Is it so true, however, that
contemporary Logic when working on proofs, does not deal with the
dynamic ?
First, there is still the old idea (dating back to at least the Aris-
totelian view on syllogisms) that some dynamic is involved when one
is accomplishing a deductive step or reading a structured inferential
discourse, insofar as one is indeed moving from sentence to sentence
following the orientation of the deduction. Nevertheless, even those who
consider inferential steps as imitating to a certain extent steps from
idea to idea (echoing the famous Cartesian description of reasoning
in the Regulae, in which the mind travels through an ordered chain
of ideas, from distinct representation to distinct representation), do
not assimilate the dynamic involved to the general, complex process
by which an individual deliberates, deduces, and modifies his or her
abstract representations and concrete judgments.
3 See Descartes, Hegel, Brouwer: actually, it is the anti-formalist topos par
excellence.
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There is, however, a second axis through which contemporary Logic
investigates directly what is undoubtedly a part of the dynamic process
of reasoning, namely heuristics. In a general sense, heuristics covers
the search for proofs of a given sentence from a given theory, hence
includes the process of determinating which relevant sentences should
be proven beforehand in the search for success. Modern formal Logic
developed numerous techniques for tackling the heuristics challenge,
importing dynamic features into proof theory. To what extent can we
conclude that a dimension of human reasoning is here modeled ? Of
course, the way the heuristic dynamic is realized at the technical level
(often using specific ad hoc formal systems suited to heuristic strategies,
instead of systems such as Natural Deduction whose devising from the
start was explicitly guided by the aim to imitate, in some respects, the
way mathematicians “naturally” happen to write their proofs) renders
difficult any comparison of the human heuristic with an artificial one.
Moreover, one could object that contrary to the natural human heuris-
tic dynamic which is part of the rational process, the artificial one stays
outside of the world of proofs, since with respect to the search process,
the produced proofs simply appear as outputs a priori not involving
any tracks of the process by which they have been produced, so as
by-products external to the dynamic.
Another kind of dynamic, though, also occupies the logical stage,
namely proofs’ normalisation, that process (first studied by G. Gentzen)
by which proofs are converted into analytic ones (but more generally
other processes of proofs’ conversion such as, for instance, elimination,
in relevant cases, of non constructive components of proofs), and which
implements a dynamic completely internal to the proofs’ world. Besides
the well-known epistemological value of the convertibility of proofs
(which legitimates abstract and −when applicable− non constructive
detours as safe proof-theoretic means), the rational flavour of the con-
version process itself deserves to be pointed out.
First of all, one has to observe that proofs, as subject to conver-
sion processes, acquire a radically new status. In this light, the basic
components of proofs, logical rules, become, literally, programming in-
structions: they determine the precise way evaluation works and control
the operational destiny of the conversion process. That proofs have been
historically first modeled, from a static point of view, as texts, turns
out to be but an epiphenomenal feature, beyond which appears their
true nature as operators acting on rational resources. (Incidentally,
one may remark that in fact, even as static objects − though now
enlightened by the dynamic perspective and adapted to it−, proofs
do no longer really fit within the proofs-as-discourses view. Indeed, in
recent proof systems like J-Y Girard’s proof-nets (Girard, 1987, 1995,
1996), their correctness depends on global geometrical properties of the
proof-structures, and so is not a locally checkable condition. Such an
account of proofs is very far from what logicians have been accustomed
to, namely textual structures linking rules of inference picked out from
a catalogue determined in advance, and of which Hilbert’s style systems
or sequents’ derivation systems are paradigmatic instances).
Moreover, like ideas, proofs also happen to live very well together.
Their “sociability” is effective not only at the static level through
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their modularity (proofs can be associated, combined, reused), but also
dynamically, as normalisation precisely shows by ensuring, in case their
combination increases the level of abtraction, that analytical avatars of
the abstract proof still remain “kept in sight”.
Thus far from being absent from proof-theory, the dynamic today
has become the central object of mainstream logical investigations, and
a conceptual unification of both dynamics − that of heuristics and that
of proofs’ conversion− is even at hand4. For all that, is the newfound
centrality of the dynamic enough to conclude that bridges between
theory of proof and theory of reasoning are now in sight ? A crucial
indication could come from assessing to what extent the intrusion of the
dynamic sheds light on the semantic aspects that reasoning reputedly
involves.
3. Referential aspects of reasoning versus inferential nature
of proofs
The uses of sentences fall into two apparently discrete modes. In the
inferential mode, which is completely internal to discourse, sentences
are used and linked together according only to their form, no matter
the interpretations they otherwise could receive. In the referential mode,
discourses are “discourses about” − they refer to−, and sentences then
are used according to interpretations of their components by refer-
ents external to discourse. The use of sentences in proofs5 provides
the paradigmatic instance of the inferential mode. At the opposite
extreme, because reasoning involves the mental handling of represen-
tations (of individuals, structures, concepts, or wathever), it usually
is taken to be an instance of the referential mode. This traditionally
accepted dichotomy, whose unifying principle is given by ‘completeness
theorems’, actually has been deeply disturbed by (relatively) recent
proof-theoretical advances (which happen to confirm in a striking way
the relevance of Michael Dummett’s remarks about the replacement of
the notion of truth by the notion of proof as the central notion of the
theory of meaning (Dummett, 1978)).
As for the prevalence of the inferential mode in proofs, one first
has to notice that proofs, at least analytic (cut-free) ones, being, so to
speak, extensional descriptions of objects or structures, clearly involve
‘internal’ denotation in the sense that they are but explicit construc-
tions. One may first illustrate this by considering the particular shape of
the analytic proofs of the type of natural integers (or other data types)
in second-order intuitionistic Natural Deduction, namely “Church’s in-
tegers”. In this first example, the reference is so to speak inferentially
built: such a proof is but the standard construction of a given integer
(in the Leibniz-Peano sense). Another example of such an inferential
explicitation of reference is given by the fact that whenever they are
4 See J-Y Girard’s Ludics (Girard, 2001).
5 i.e. the various ways sentences are concretely handled in proofs (for instance,
in Natural Deduction systems, by such or such “introduction” and “elimination”
rules).
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in a relevant form, analytic proofs literally describe models: think of
the model (the counter-model) that one literally ‘reads’ in the ana-
lytic (pseudo-)proof of an (unprovable) sentence generated by the (here
failed) proof-search strategy used to prove the completeness theorem
for first-order Logic6.
But, of course, the main point is elsewhere. Beyond this first kind of
‘inferential reference’, subtler accounts of proofs denotation have been
elaborated by contemporary proof theory, gradually realizing, at vari-
ous levels and with always more relevance, Heyting’s beautiful original
idea of considering proofs as functions and not simply as texts.
All these semantics are semantics of proofs (as opposed to semantics
of sentences), which means that they approximate the nature of proofs
as operators, catching their “being” as a “doing”7 and revealing the na-
ture of argumentative dealings as computations over rational resources
(one recovers a universal operational meaning for sentences themselves,
in case one is able to identify an operational behavior common to all
proofs of a given sentence8).
At one pole, there is denotational semantics, where proofs are di-
rectly interpreted by functions belonging to suited set-theoretically
defined functions spaces (in such a way that the interpretation of proofs
is invariable during their normalisation). However, semantics of this
kind keep only a shadow of proofs’ dynamic: interpretation remains
too extensional and equalizes computations that should not be consid-
ered as equal and so, semantics fail to spot many intentional dynamic
features.
At the opposite pole, one finds operational semantics, the “behaviourist”
approach of the dynamic of proofs. A function is simply identified with
the paraphrastic description of the set of all computations steps (of all
the sequences of states describing possible evaluations). The defect in
this case is converse to the former one: too much intentionality also
kills off intentionality.
Between these two extreme poles, there is the more recent interaction
semantics (“game semantics” and “ludics”), where dynamic (evalua-
tion) is interpreted as a structured interaction, described, in the lan-
guage of Game-Theory, as plays between processes whose rules struc-
ture their inter-communication (and where “conversion dynamic” and
“proof-search dynamic” tend to coincide).
In the other hand, as regards the prevalence of the referential mode
concerning reasoning and its “semantic contents”, etc., one must con-
versely observe that, while one does not assume something like a “men-
tal discourse” that would be used when we are reasoning, the words
“referential mode”, which, as they have been introduced above, do only
apply to discourses (not to “psychological entities” like ideas), happen
to be used here improperly and mistakenly. Yet, to assume the exis-
tence of such a mental discourse somehow amounts to reduplicating the
6 See for instance: Wainer and Wallen (1992).
7 “Church’s integers” for instance, to continue with our example, dynamically
appear as iterators.
8 Particular case of Krivine’s “specification problem” (Danos and Krivine, 2000).
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speaker “inside” the speaker, thus adopting the old vain prosopopeia
of intellectual faculties (whose aporetic nature, being rather commonly
acknowledged, do not require here deeper presentation9). Only one
way remains thus open: as soon as reasoning is concerned, we must
completely reverse the traditional view about meaning, now looking
at it as an issue addressed, no longer to sentences, but to processes
themselves.
Of course, at first sight, such a radical shift seems to present more new
problems than answers. First of all because as we have seen, the notion
of “process” seems very tricky compared to that of “discourse” (at
least insofar as reasoning is concerned), but also because the account
of meaning one henceforth must give in order to escape the above
“reduplication” difficulty could no longer be in terms of something
external (as referents did with respect to discourses), but of something
completely internal to the world of processes. Thus how could meaning
generation be a property of processes ? As vague as the notion of process
may be, it certainly is in their nature not only to evolve (amongst the
effects produced by a process appear its own transformations), but
also to produce effects on other processes, mutual effects. In short,
processes act and interact. Whatever its technological matter, whatever
its implementation, the essence of a process is completely involved in its
(potential) dynamic behavior: not only its own possible destinies under
evaluation, but also the full set of possible operational effects it will
occasion in all possible processes’ interaction contexts. With respect to
semantics, the answer brought by processes is thus of a radically new
kind, which implements the performative way of meaning10: doing, is
the way processes speak.
Enlightened by the theory of proofs’ dynamic, the inferential mode
is thus in the end far from being non referential. Moreover, the kind of
semantics onto which it opens, do not incur the two major reproaches
that the usual modelings of reference do, namely to award no proper
status to abstraction (now caught by computational complexity and
non analyticity of proofs) and to offer an evaluation-independant ap-
proach to sense. In that connection, it is not the least of the virtues of
the operational viewpoint in Logic that it sheds light not only on the
analogy between proofs conversion and rational dynamic, not only on
the inseparability of evaluation and sense, but even finally, as we are
going to see now, on nonsense itself.
9 For a synthetic presentation of the sophism of “homoncules”, see Pinkas 1995.
About the “mental language” thema, see the beautiful book of Claude Panaccio:
“Le discours inte´rieur” (Panaccio 1999).
10 I am borrowing from Danos (1990), himself inspired by Austin terminology,
the idea of “performativity” , there used to qualify formal systems of proofs (like
Krivine’s AF2) where proofs indeed do (as programs) what the sentences they are
proving “say” they should. For a more complete presentation and a defense of the
concept of “performativity” applied to the semantics of proofs, see J.-B. Joinet, “Sur
le temps logique”, to appear in Logique et Interaction: Ge´ome´trie de la Cognition,
J.-B. Joinet (ed.), Publications de la Sorbonne, 2006 (or 2007), Paris.
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4. Correctness of proofs versus Indeterminacy of reasoning
Reasoning in its general sense includes “wrong reasoning”: mistakes,
inconsistencies, errances, partiality, revision, interruption of reflection
(because of abstruseness, loops to be broken, breaks to be taken, emer-
gencies or whatever). By contrast, when proof theory was born at the
beginning of last century, it was certainly not conceived of as including
a theory of “non-proofs”. Admittedly, the definition of formal proof
systems that was provided by Logic supplied decision procedures sepa-
rating texts accepted as proofs from other texts (provided the catalogue
of rules is set). Although such a definition thus gave a de facto account
of what “wrong proofs” are, their status remained that of garbage, not
worth studying.
On these issues, the recent transformations in proof theory, now
focused not so much on proofs themselves as on their dynamic, have
broadened the outlook. The first though not the main point: because
once the dynamic is concretely implemented, occasions for new kinds
of mistakes may happen (in the real world, “un pas suffit pour un faux-
pas”11; the evaluation could be interrupted etc). But overall, because
of the status of proofs having changed, that of non-proofs, as a result,
also has changed. From the proofs-as-programs viewpoint, a proof is
no longer just a normed discourse, but a process whose operationality,
tamed by Logic, is “under control”. This becomes clear once one tackles
proofs in computational terms: then a proof is a typed program, whose
typability ensures that certain computational properties are satisfied
(typically: termination, complexity bounds12, etc). Nevertheless unty-
pable programs − those processes that do not correspond to proofs and
that Logic fails to civilize− share with proofs their life as dynamic
entities, their computational nature.
The new status that paradoxes acquire when scrutinized from the
belvedere of the dynamic illustrates this radical change of viewpoint.
The traditional reasons given to reject inconsistency, from Aristotle
(dialogue become impossible) to modern Logic (every sentence becomes
provable: all of them becoming equivalent, there could be no meaning),
may now be unifyingly reformulated: inconsistency permits the typing
of infinite − and even infinitely silent− computations13. The point with
paradoxical theories is thus not so much that they violently equalize
sentences, but that they produce computational exuberance, and leads
to the degeneration of the evaluation of meaning.
5. Conclusion
The “naturalness” of Natural Deduction, akin to the way math-
ematicians historically have come to write their proofs, is the fruit
of the imitative intention which governed its settlement by Gerhard
Gentzen. Any extension of such a “figurative” attempt to reasoning
itself stumbles over our inability to describe and even recognize what
11 Carlo Goldoni (original italian version not recovered).
12 See Girard, 1998 and Danos and Joinet, 2002.
13 Adding X = ¬X (X an atomic formula), non-normalisable λ-terms like ∆∆
become typable.
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we are suppose to imitate. Because no criterion for the success of the
imitation enterprise is offered when the reasoning is on the line of
sight, simulation, imitation, figurativity have properly no methodologi-
cal meaning. The best one can try then is, on the one hand, to recover at
most some of the features of this globally uncatchable phenomenon (e.g.
dynamic features), and on the other hand, to reach some more abstract
form of naturalness appearing in “aesthetic” properties like simplicity,
universality, non-diffuseness (cf. proof nets’ sobriety), harmony (input
/ output rules (Prawitz, 1977)) or in “architectonic” properties like
modularity, transparent cutting-out into subsystems, representational
strength (complexity). . .
Of course the need for such an “artificial naturalness”, could be
interpreted as the sign that, ever further from human thought, the
drift of Logic − from its philosophical origins to mathematics, and
now from mathematics to theoretical computer science− henceforth
is, and with no return, consummated. Logic would just have become
a foundational theory of computing, a technical device for designing
and studying computation and programming languages14. In this con-
nection, the current extension of the Curry-Howard style approach to
new programming devices oriented toward communication (Danos and
Krivine, 2000) instead of usual recursive computation of data (so ever
closer to technological issues, ever further from what was, century after
century, the central concern of Logic: rational thought) seems somehow
to confirm this metamorphosis of Logic toward technology.
However, the Logical Foundations of Computing could just as well be
dually seen “from the other side of the isomorphism” as Computational
Foundations for Logic15. From this complementary viewpoint, where
studied objects are dynamic ones, with an operationally, interactively
built-in evaluation semantics, and among which even paradoxes receive
a relevant dynamic status, Logic has probably never appeared so close
to being the theory of reasoning.
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